JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: THE
DANGER INHERENT IN THE
DETERMINATION OF
ARBITRABILITY
In 1932, the United States Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia

Act, which prohibited federal judges from granting injunctive relief in
any case arising out of a labor dispute.' The stated purpose for the
Act's prohibition was to ensure that the individual employee would be
free from restraint or coercion by his employer in choosing
representatives to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment.2 Congress passed- this Act to counteract the federal
judiciary's demonstrated partiality toward employers. 3 The statute
achieved the desired effect of impeding employers' easy access to
injunctive relief in a federal forun; however, it also had the unintended
1. See Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976)).
The statute provides: "No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any

restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute ... ." "Labor dispute" is defined in section 13(c) of the Act as "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or

representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976). Several cases apply a
judicial gloss to this definition of "labor dispute." See, e.g., Columbia River Packers Ass'n v.
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145-47 (1942); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley
Farm Prods, Inc, 311 US. 91, 96-97, 99-100 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U.S. 552, "559-62 (1938). Other cases discuss the necessity of an employer/employee
relationship. See, eg., Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 1939). But
see Green v. Obergfell, 121 F.2d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
2. Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), outlines the public policy

of the United States:
Wher
r prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental
authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and otjer forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain
acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to
decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotithe terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
ate
interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargiig or other mutual aid or protection; therefore. the followng definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the ourts of the
United States are hereby enacted.
3. See 75 Cohi. REC. 4915 (1932) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (purpose of the Act is to
ensure that government, particularly the courts, is neutral in labor disputes).
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effect of increasing the frequency with which strikes occurred.4
Consequently, Congress reintroduced a role for the judiciary in labor
dispute settlement in 1947, when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act.5
Under the provisions of section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, federal
courts were given jurisdiction over suits involving breaches of collective
6
bargaining agreements.
In the years following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the
federal courts struggled to reconcile the apparent conflict in
congressional policy between the Taft-Hartley Act, which granted
courts the authority to settle disputes over collective bargaining
agreement violations, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which deprived
the courts of what is often the only effective mechanism for resolving
such. disputes-the power to grant injunctive relief. The Supreme
Court of the United States has handed down a series of decisions in an
effort to reconcile the two statutes, but the result has been an unclear
directive to the lower federal courts. The Court has repeatedly
admonished the lower federal courts that, when confronted with a
collective bargaining agreement containing a mandatory arbitration
clause, they should not usurp the arbitrator's function by looking to the
merits of the dispute underlying the request for injunctive relief.7 Yet,
by making the determination of "arbitrability"' a prerequisite to the
granting of injunctive relief, the Supreme Court has opened the door
for encroachment upon the arbitrator's role and upon the parties'
freedom to contract for an exclusive method of dispute settlement.
This note outlines the steps the Supreme Court has taken in
reconciling Taft-Hartley with Norris-LaGuardia that have led to the
shift in emphasis away from consideration of equitable standards for
injunctive relief and instead toward consideration of whether the
dispute is arbitrable. 9 Using United Auto Workers v. Dana Corp. 10 as
4. Shank, Boys Markets Injunctions: The Contiuing Clash Between Norris-LaGuardiaand
Taft-Hartley, 35 Sw. LJ. 899, 899 (1981).

5. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156 [TaftHartley Act], is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).

6. Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between
any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
7. See, ag., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
8. See generally Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
9. See infra Section I.
10. 679 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc grantedand opinion vacated,id at 654 (Aug.

12, 1982).
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an example, this note examines the manner in which the concentration
on arbitrability" has led lower federal courts to decide at the
preliminary injunction stage the merits of cases arising out of labor
disputes.' 2 The note demonstrates that a presumption of arbitrability
would allow the courts to focus on traditional equitable standards for
injunctive relief, such as the nature of the harm threatened, so that they
can determine whether an injunction is warranted, despite the NorrisLaGuardia ban, without reaching the merits of the underlying
dispute. 13 The note examines the manner in which the shift in
emphasis from equitable standards for injunctive relief toward a
determination of arbitrability leads the federal courts into examination
of the merits of the underlying dispute.' 4 This note proposes a return
to the presumption of arbitrability in those cases in which the risk of
usurping the arbitrator's role is greatest, those in which the conduct
sought to be enjoined is the same conduct allegedly in violation of the
collective bargaining agreement.' 5 This solution would protect the
arbitrator's role as interpreter of the collective bargaining agreement by
minimizing the level of permissible judicial involvement in the merits
of the dispute.
I.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. Development of a NationalLabor Policy.
Judicial involvement in labor disputes was the accepted norm at
common law. Prior to 1932, employers could readily obtain injunctive
relief against striking employees by resort to sympathetic courts.' 6 Injunctions would issue whenever a complainant invoked the due process
7
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to protect his property.'
The courts often held that employers possessed property rights in the
11. See generally Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976)
(concentrating on arbitrability).
12. See infra Section IH.
13. See infra notes 93-127 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 106-32 and accompanying text.
16. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970); see
aso Shank, supra note 4, at 899.
17. f Limtting Scope of Injunctions in Labor Dispures,Hearings on S. 1482 Before the Subcomnm of the Senate Comm. on theJudc4ry,pt. 4,70th Cong., 1st Sss. 681, 698 (1928) (statement
of Winter S. Martin, atty, for Am. Fed. of Labor) [hereinafter cited as Martin, Statement to Subcomm. J ("The only vague and intangible rights that are now protected by injunction are these
labor rights ....
In labor cases it is issued because the right to the earnings from labor is
considered as a property right which should be protected at any cost by injunction."); Id at 70330 (further explaining use of injunctions to protect property interests in labor).
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uninterrupted employment of their labor force.13 This notion of a
property interest in a human being or his services should have been
discarded shortly after the adoption of the thirteenth amendment. 19
Congressmen who worked on labor legislation during the Depression
voted to ban the granting of injunctions in labor disputes because they
believed that use of an injunction to compel men to remain at work
20
created a condition of involuntary servitude.
The passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 reflected the
congressional concern that a pro-management judiciary was aiding employers by failing to protect the thirteenth amendment rights of employees.21 Section 4 of the Act prohibited federal courts from granting
injunctive relief in any suit arising out of a labor dispute. 22 In practice,
the Act did not entirely prevent employers from obtaining injunctions,
which were still available in many state courts.2 3 Nevertheless, strikes
flourished as a result of the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition, and the labor movement grew in strength.
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, commonly referred to
as the Wagner Act,2 4 further tipped the balance in favor of the unions.2 5 The stated purpose of the Wagner Act was to curb various management activities that tended to discourage employee participation in
26
collective action.
18. The Supreme Court, in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), attempted to halt the
practice of treating an individual's labor as his employer's property. Justice Hughes, writing for
the majority, declared that: "The plain intention [of the thirteenth amendment] was to abolish
slavery of whatever name and form ... ; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which
the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit which is the essence
of involuntary servitude:' Id at 241; see also Martin, Statement to Subcomm, supra note 17, at
717-20 (discussing Bailey).
19. See Martin, Statement to Subcomm., supra note 17, at 696, 720-22.
20. See id at 721.
21. Gould, On Labor Injunctions PendingArbitration:Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L.
REV.533, 534-35 (1976) ("The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 embodied a congressional reaction
against the federal judiciary's partiality" toward employers.); see also 75 CONG. Rac. 4915-18
(1932) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
22. For the pertinent text of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, see supra note 1.
23. In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390'U.S. 557 (1968), the Supreme Court ameliorated the effect of Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 502-06 (1962), which held
that Taft-Hartley does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over suits for violation of contracts
between employers and labor organizations, without resolving whether parties could circumvent
the anti-injunction provision of Norris-LaGuardia by seeking redress in state courts. See 390 U.S.
at 560 n.2. TheAvco Court provided for the removal of section 301(a) [Taft-Hartley injunction]
actions initially brought in state court to federal court under the federal question removal jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). SeeAveo, 390 U.S. at 560 n.2.
24. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976)).
25. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). In his statement before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor, Senator Wagner noted that since the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act,

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1983:848

The labor movement gained momentum in the twelve years that
followed the adoption of the Wagner Act. By 1947, Congress became
concerned that unions were gaining strength disproportionately and
perceived a need to protect both employers and employees from unfair
labor tactics by unions. Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, to equalize bargaining strength and further encourage unions and employers to
enter into collective bargaining agreements. 27 The Act provided the
judiciary with a renewed role in the settlement of labor disputes. 28
Under section 301 of the Act, if a union and an employer are parties to
a collective bargaining agreement,2 9 a suit to enforce that agreement
can properly be entertained in federal court.
Since the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, federal courts have tried
to accommodate two conflicting policies.30 The Norris-LaGuardia Act
instructed the courts not to involve themselves in the labor dispute settlement process. 31 The Taft-Hartley Act, on the other hand, permitted
federal courts to settle disputes concerning violation of the very agreement embodying the dispute settling mechanism. 32 The labor policies
of these Acts conflict because Congress apparently neglected to revise
development of collective action had been "so one sided that there is danger of a worse balance
than persisted in the past." To Createa NationalLabor Board"Heaingson S. 2926 Before the
Senate Comm on EducationandLabor,73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
In addition he claimed that trade associations were being strengthened while labor organizational
efforts were being thwarted. Id
27. See Taft-Hartley Act § 201, 61 Stat. 152 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1976)).
28. For the text of § 301(a), see supra noe 6.

29. Justice Douglas defined a collective bargaining agreement as "an effort to erect a system
of industrial self-government." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 580 (1960).
30. It has been argued that section 301 [Taft-Hartley] enforcement should override NorrisLaGuardia because injunctions enforcing contract obligations were not a central concern of Norris-LaGuardia. Cantor, Buffalo Forge and Injunctions Against Employer Breaches of Collective
BargainingAgreements, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 247, 251. See generally Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249-53 (1970). The argument for injunctive relief in furtherance of contract obligations received support in judicial discussions of the Railway Labor Act,
44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976)) although the Railway Labor Act obligations are statutory rather than contractual. See, eg.. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp.
Union, 402 U.S. 570, 583 (1971). See generally Cantor, supra.
31. See supra note 1.
32. Accord Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957) (section 301
"authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific performance of promises to
arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining agreements"). The Court based its interpretation
of section 301 on the philosophy of the section as enunciated in the Senate Report: "Statutory
recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding and enforceable contract is a logical
and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such
agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace." Id at 454 (quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1947)).
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the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to make them consistent
33
with the change in congressional concerns between 1932 and 1947.
The task of accommodation, therefore, fell on the courts by default.
B.

The Impact of Reconciling Norris-LaGuardiawith Taft-Hartley on
the Judiciary'sApproach to Requestsfor Injunctions in
Labor Disputes.

The Supreme Court took advantage of its earliest opportunity to
interpret the authorization contained in section 301 of the Taft-Hartley
Act. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 34 decided in 1957, the
Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act enabled federal courts to "fashion
a body of federal law for the enforcement of... collective bargaining
agreements ... includ[ing] within that federal law specific perform-

ance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining
agreements. ' 35 The Lincoln Mills Court based its holding on the principles that the employer's agreement to arbitrate was the quid pro quo
for the union's agreement not to strike and that the procedural requirements of section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia would not be applied to frustrate a federal court's power to enforce an employer's obligation to
arbitrate under section 301 of Taft-Hartley. 36 Norris-LaGuardia did
not deprive the courts of power to issue injunctions to compel arbitration, because such compulsion was not "part and parcel of the abuses
against which the Act was aimed. 37 According to the Lincoln Mills
Court, because Congress favored settlement of disputes by arbitration,
the courts were free from the restrictions of Norris-LaGuardia if the
action to compel arbitration was brought under section 301 of the TaftHartley Act.
Three years after Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court handed down
decisions in three successive cases involving the United Steelworkers of
America. In what has commonly been referred to as the "Steelworkers
Trilogy," 38 the Court sought to preclude judicial determination of the
33. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
34. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
35. Id at 451. The relief in section 301 cases "varies-from specific performance of the
promise to arbitrate.. . to enforcement or annulment of an arbitration award .... to an award
of compensatory damages. . . , and the like." Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557,
561 (1968) (citations omitted).
36. 353 U.S. 448,455,458-59 (1957). The Court stated that "section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does, indeed, indicate a congressional policy toward settlement of labor disputes by arbitration, for it denies injunctive relief to any person who has failed to make 'every reasonable
effort' to settle the dispute by... 'voluntary arbitration.'" Id at 458.
37. Id at 458.
38. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (dispute over employer's
refusal to arbitrate grievance filed by employee who was disabled on the job); United Steelworkers
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merits of labor disputes by emphasizing equitable standards for injunctive relief rather than contractual considerations. The Court interpreted the Wagner Act's provisions encouraging arbitration of labor
disputes to mean that federal courts should not delve into the substantive provisions of the disputed labor contract; instead, the courts should
confine themselves to compelling arbitration when there is an arbitration clause included in the contract.3 9 The Court held that federal
courts should resolve all doubts regarding arbitrability by presuming
that the dispute is covered by the arbitration clause and should treat all
arbitration awards as presumptively valid.4° The Court thus attempted
to confine the adjudicative function to "ascertaining whether the party
seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by
the contract," and admonished the courts that they have "no business
weighing the merits of the grievance." 4 1 Despite its intentions to the
contrary, the Steelworkers Trilogy Court actually laid the groundwork
for judicial forays into the merits when it required that a dispute be
arbitrable, albeit presumptively, before the trial court could determine
whether an injunction to compel specific performance of the contract
was warranted under ordinary equitable standards for injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court subsequently held in Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson4 2 that the Taft-Hartley Act did not mitigate the impact of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on injunctions. The Court made no attempt to reconcile the Sinclair decision with its prior holdings in Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy. The Sinclair decision
effectively permitted unions to enter into collective bargaining agreements containing no-strike provisions and later to strike in defiance of
such agreements without fear of judicial intervention. The Court's decision in Sinclair plainly ignored Taft-Hartley's grant of jurisdiction
and deprived employers of incentive to enter into collective bargaining
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (dispute over employer's refusal to arbitrate grievance regarding contracting out); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960) (dispute over provision for reinstatement with backpay subsequent to an

arbitrator's finding in favor of the union member).
39. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-69 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Etiterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
40. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).
41. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
42. 370 U.S. 195, 213 (1962), overmled, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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agreements. 43 Scholarly criticism 44 and lower court efforts45 to undermine the Sinclair holding culminated in the overruling of Sinclair in
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770.46
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court created an exception to the

Norris-LaGuardia Act's prohibition against the granting of injunctive
relief. The Court upheld an injunction against a strike that had been

called in violation of a no-strike clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 47 The Boys Markets Court held that the use of in-

junctive relief to further the policy behind the Wagner Act favoring the
peaceful resolution of labor disputes was not contrary to the policy behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 4 8 Hence, injunctions against strikes
pending arbitration were excepted from the general Norris-LaGuardia
ban whenever the collective bargaining agreement contained a no49
strike clause.

43. See Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 216 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our duty... is to seek out that
accommodation of [Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley] which will give the fullest possible effect
to the purposes of both.").
44. See generally Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective BargainingAgreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1027 (1963); Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration,
55 VA. L. REV. 427 (1969); Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From
Lincoln Mills to Avco andBeyond, 15 VILL. L. Rav. 32 (1969); Kiernan, Availabiliy of Injunctions
Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALB. L. REv. 303 (1968); Wellington, The No-Strike Clauseandthe Labor Injunction Timefor a Re-examination, 30 U. Prrr. L.
Rv. 293 (1968); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretationand the PoliticalProcess: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547 (1963).
45. The courts of appeals also tried to undermineSinclair. See, e.g., New Orleans S.S. Ass'n
v. General Longshore Workers, 389 F.2d 369, 371-72 (5th Cir.) (Sinclairdoes not prevent federal
district courts from enforcing an arbitrator's order to terminate work stoppages even though this
amounts, in effect, to an injunction), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
46. 398 U.S. 235, 240-55 (1970).
47. In Boys Markets, the dispute arose when employees who were not members of the union
rearranged the frozen food cases in one of the company's supermarkets. When the employer
would not accede to the union's demand that the cases be restocked by union members, the union
called a strike. The district court enjoined the strike; the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed under Sinclair. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770,
416 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and overruled
Sinclair. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 238.
48. The Court stated that the "central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster the
growth and viability of labor organizations is hardly retarded-if anything, this goal is advanced-by a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation that the union freely undertook
under a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to arbitration." 398 U.S. 235, 25253 (1970).
49. Injunctions against strikes are permitted when the strike is both in breach of a no-strike
obligation and over an arbitrable grievance that the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate.
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 625 F.2d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1980).
Justice Brennan narrowed the holding in Boys Markets to cover only situations in which the collective bprgaining agreement contained arbitration as a mandatory grievance procedure. Boys
Markets, 398 U.S. at 253.
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The Boys Markets Court sought to protect the role of the arbitrator by requiring that employers be ordered to arbitrate as a condition
for the granting of injunctive relief.50 The purpose of this requirement
is to force a reluctant party to the bargaining table, rather than the
court merely enjoining the self-help to which it had resorted. 51 This
requirement also ensures that the party seeking injunctive relief has
first exhausted all other reasonable methods of resolution.
In order for the Boys Markets exception to the congressional ban
on injunctive relief to apply, the collective bargaining agreement in
question must contain a "mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure." 52 In addition, the Court in Boys Markets held that
courts should consider the following equitable standards for injunctive
relief: whether it appears a breach has occurred or will be committed;
whether such a breach will resultin irreparable harm; and whether the
complaining party will be injured more by the refusal to issue the in53
junction than the defending party will be injured by its issuance.
In 1976, the Supreme Court placed an additional limitation on a
party's ability to gain injunctive relief in a labor dispute. In Buffalo
50. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254; see also Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295, Int'l
Bhd. ofTeamsters, 449 F.2d 586, 588-89 (2d Cir.) (expanding Boys Markets by requiring that both
parties be contractually bound to arbitrate), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1971). See generally
Shank, supra note 4 (describing the employer's duty to arbitrate as a condition to the granting of
injunctive relief).
51. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248-49, 252. In the Boys Markets opinion, the Court
"determined that the dissenting opinion in Sinclair states the correct principles concerning the
accommodation necessary between the seemingly absolute terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the policy considerations underlying § 301(a)." 398 U.S. at 249. The dissenting opinion in
Sinclair suggested:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive relief
against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an
injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is
sought to be enjoined because is over a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds
that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate,
as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District
Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted
under ordinary principles of equty-whether breaches are occurring and will continue.
or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause
irreparable injury to the ernployer;, and whether the employer will suffer more from the

denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance.

Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 228 (Brennan J1.,dissenting), quoted/n Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 254.

52. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253.

53. See Id at 254 (quoting Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, 3., dissenting)).
The reference to "property" was dropped by the Court from what otherwise appears to be a
paraphrasing of the language found in section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See 47 Stat. 71
(1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976)). One possible explanation for this omission is the
Court's deference to the states on matters--such as the protection of property--that are more

properly within the states' police power. Protectin of free speech and free labor, on the other
hand, are first and thirteenth amendment considerations, respectively, and are more properly handied by the judiciary.
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Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,54 the Court refused to issue an in-

junction against a sympathy strike because the strike was not over a
dispute covered by the arbitration provisions of the collective bargain-

ing agreement.55 Hence, the Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctive relief, contingent as it was on the issuance

of a concurrent order to compel arbitration, did not apply. The Court
noted that a sympathy strike, by its very nature, is not a grievance over
which the union and the employer could reach an agreement through

arbitration; in a sympathy strike, the terms and conditions of employment being challenged are those of a sister union and not those of the

striking union.5 6 The holding of Buffalo Forge was that the Boys Mar-

kets exception to Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctive relief5 7 applied
only when the alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement
frustrated a pledge to arbitrate.5 8 The Supreme Court thus narrowed

its broad exception to Norris-LaGuardia to circumstances in which the
underlying grievance, not simply the activity sought to be enjoined, was
covered by a mandatory arbitration clause contained in the collective

bargaining agreement governing the parties. In so holding, the Court
moved one step further in the direction of concentrating on the arbi-

trability issue instead of the equitable standards for injunctive relief.
The Buffalo Forge decision represented a shift in the Court's em-

phasis from the nature of the injury threatened to the content of the
labor agreement.59 Recognizing this shift, Justice Stevens dissented
strikes did not imfrom the Court's opinion, 60 arguing that sympathy
61

plicate the central concern of Norris-LaGuardia.

54. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
55. See id at 411-13.
56. Id at 407. Sympathy strikes are not arbitrable grievances because the workers are not
striking over a breach by their employer of their collective bargaining agreement; rather, they are
striking because the employer of workers with whom they sympathize is violating an agreement to
which they are not parties.
57. Boys Markets does not contain the only exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), the Supreme Court held that NorrisLaGuardia does not apply to the United States as an employer.
58. 428 U.S. at 409-12. In Buffalo Forge, the Court would have allowed an injunction preserving the status quo pending arbitration only when such an injunction would be "essential to
carry out promises to arbitrate and to implement the private arrangements for the administration
of the contract." Id at 411. The phrase "frustrate the arbitral process" was interpreted in"Lever
Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976), to mean
conduct taken by a party that.would render the arbitrator's award no more than a hollow formal-

ity because, when ordered, the award would not return the parties substantially to the status quo
ante. Id at 123.
59. Shank, supra note 4, at 917.
60. 428 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by three other Justices--most notably Justice Brennan, who wrote a concurrence in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
dissent in Sinclair, and the majority opinion in Boys Markets.
61. Id at 428-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens based his opinion not only on the

DUKE LAW JOURM4L
II.

[Vol

1983:848

JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF ARBITRABILITY AS A MEANS OF

REACHING THE MERITS OF LABOR DISPUTES

The problems created by focusing on the arbitrability of the grievance underlying the conduct sought to be enjoined become most apparent when a union is seeking an injunction against an employer's
actions. Under these circumstances, the conduct that the union seeks to
enjoin may be identical to the conduct that precipitated the underlying
dispute or that it claims to be in violation of the collective bargaining
agreement. 62 Hence, making the determination of arbitrability the
threshold issue necessarily increases the risk that the case will be disposed of on its merits at the preliminary injunction stage.63 A recent
case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit illustrates the consequences of focusing on arbitrability, rather
than potential injury, as the threshold issue in preliminary injunction
hearings."
UnitedAuto Workers v. Dana Corp. raises a number of important
issues. At the threshold, there is the issue of whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the Supreme Court cases construing it, apply when a
union is seeking an injunction against an employer. The Dana case also

raises the more fundamental issue of whether the congressional policy
favoring resolution of labor disputes through arbitration is consistent
with the Dana court's extensive examination of the merits. The question then arises how best to further that policy and protect the role of
the arbitrator. Even the Dana decision suggests that traditional equitable standards provide sufficient bases for disposing of requests for injunctive relief without necessitating an examination of the merits of the
underlying dispute. Thus the final question raised by Dana is by what
mechanism the courts can turn their attention to equitable standards
for injunctive relief, yet preserve the arbitrator's role in deciding the
presumptions outlined in the Steelworkers Trilogy, see supra text accompanying note 40, but also
on the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368

(1974). In Gateway Coal, the Court held that a promise not to strike should be implied unless
there is an express provision in the contract to the contrary. See id at 381. The Court previously

had held that courts should not imply a promise not to strike as the quid pro quo for a promise to
arbitrate. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).

62. In the case of strikes by unions in violation of no-strike agreements, the employer is
seeking an injunction against the strike, but the grievance is typically over wages, hours, or working conditions. In the case of activities by employers in violation of collective bargaining agreements, the union is seeking an injunction against the very activity giving rise to the grievance.
63. See Cantor, supra note 30, at 265.
64. See UAW v. Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1982), rehk en bancgranted andopinion
vacated, id at 654 (Aug. 12, 1982).
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merits of a dispute, if the courts must make any grant of such relief
contingent upon a finding that the underlying dispute is arbitrable.
This section examines each of these issues and suggests a possible
solution.
A.

United Auto Workers v. Dana Corp.

A summary of the facts of UnitedAuto Workers v. Dana Corp. will
provide a basis for discussion of the problems inherent in the determination of arbitrability. A collective bargaining agreement between
Dana, a multistate corporation, and the United Auto Workers (UAW)
provided that disputes "of any kind" arising between the company and
the union should be processed through a detailed grievance procedure.6 5 The agreement provided that if a dispute over "interpretation
and/or application of terms" could not be resolved by designated representatives of each side, the dispute was to be submitted to an arbitrator whose determination was to be "final and binding upon both the
Union and the company." 66 In a letter intended to supplement this
agreement, Dana promised to maintain a neutral position67whenever the
UAW became involved in organizing Dana employees.
The dispute giving rise to the litigation began when the UAW attempted to organize employees at the Wix Corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Dana.68 When the president of Wix distributed a
letter addressed to the Wix employees stating that Dana was opposed
to unionization of the plants, the UAW filed a grievance according to
the procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, complaining that the Wix Corporation's president had violated Dana's neutrality promise. 69 When the parties were unable to resolve the
70
grievance, the UAW appealed directly to the Permanent Arbitrator.
When Dana failed to respond to the UAW's request for emergency ar65. Id at 636. This procedure was to serve as the exclusive dispute settling mechanism.
66. Id

67. Id at 637.
68. Id The UAW notified Dana by letter of its organizational efforts and reminded Dana of
the neutrality agreement. Upon the UAW's petition to the National Labor Relations Board

(NLRB), an election to determine a collective bargaining agent for the Wix employees was set for
June 12, 1980.

69. Id at 638.
70. Id Dana cancelled the arbitration date because it was unprepared. Subsequently, both
parties agreed to postpone the hearing indefinitely upon Dana's express promise to refrain from
committing the challenged acts. Once again, however, the UAW sought arbitration, complaining

that violation of the agreement persisted.
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bitration, the Union filed a request in federal district court 7 l for a tern71. As an alternative to court action, the UAW could have pursued an unfair labor practice
charge against Dana before the NLRB. Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), as amended, allows the NLRB discretion to petition for injunctive relief whenever it
believes such relief is warranted. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976). The NLRB will generally exercise
this discretion only if failure to maintain the status quo would render any subsequent Board determination meaningless. Although the UAW probably could have obtained a § 10(j) injunction, it
chose not to proceed through the NLRB. The UAW probably believed that an NLRB decision,
even one as preliminary as this, would take too long to provide relief prior to the election. Even if
it were under less of a time constraint, the UAW would likely have proceeded through the NLRB
only if it had perceived the Board as a more "favored" plaintiff than itself. There is no evidence
that this was the case.
The authorization contained in sections 10(j) and 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (1976), carves
out an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia ban on the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes.
The interplay between the NLRA, Norris-LaGuardia, and Taft-Hartley raises a number of questions. First, if an action constitutes both a violation of a collective bargaining agreement and an
unfair labor practice, what body has jurisdiction? See,tg., William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters
Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12 (1974) (NLRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction when an activity is
both an unfair labor practice and a breach of a collective bargaining agreement). Second, is exhaustion of administrative remedies required under these circumstances? Section 8 of NorrisLaGuardia provides that a complainant may not get injunctive relief if he fails to make "every
reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or Wth the aidofany avallablegovernmentalmachinery." 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) (emphasis added). This would seem to suggest that
there is an exhaustion requirement. On the other hand, the legislative history of the NLRA
reveals Congress' intent that "[o]nce parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National
Labor Relati6ns Board." COMMrrn OF CONFERENCE, REPORT ON THE LABOR-MANAOEMENT
RFLATIONS ACT OF 1947, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., IstSess. 42 (1947), reprintedin 1947
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1147. BAmi. McLeod ex rel NLRB v. American Fed'n of Television &
Radio Artists, N.Y. Local, 234 F. Supp. 832, 840 (S.D.N.Y.) ("when the Board petitions to enjoin
an unfair labor practice the mere fact that this unfair labor practice involves a clause [of a collective bargaining agreement] subject to arbitration should not remove this case from the broader
rules of law applicable to [suits by the Board for temporary injunctive relief pending determination of the unfair labor practice charges] and place it totally within the realm of section 301(a)
suits which govern suits by employer and/or employee") (emphasis in original), aj'd,351 F.2d 310
(2d Cir. 1964). Third, can an arbitrator decide issues that come under the unfair labor practice
provisions of the NLRA? Section 10 of the NLRA gives the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction in such
cases, but the NLRB can defer to an arbitrator. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (k) (1976). For discussion
on this point, see Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955) (the "Spielberg Doctrine" provides that the NLRB will not defer to an arbitrator unless it is convinced that the arbitrator has
fully and fairly considered the unfair labor practice issues); see also Note,.DIscrinhatoryDfrcilIne
of Union RepresentativesforBreach oftheir "HigherDuy"in Illegal Strikes, 1982 DuKE L J,900,
928 n.158.
The interplay among the three statutes appears to produce the following pattern of effects:
(1)Taft-Hartley applies to non-arbitrable contract disputes; (2) the NLRA's unfair labor practice
provisions apply to non-"contracted away" unfair labor practice disputes; and (3) Norris-LaGuardia applies when there is no contract or when the contract dispute is not arbitrable. When the
contract dispute may be arbitrable, however, and one party refuses to arbitrate even the threshold
issue of whether the contract dispute is subject to arbitration, Norris-LaGuardia does not apply,
and the court may issue an injunction pending determination by the arbitrator of the coverage
issue under the court's Taft-Hartley powers. If the dispute is covered by the arbitration clause, the
arbitrator has jurisdiction; if it is not covered by the arbitration clause, the federal court has

jurisdiction.
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porary restraining order, pending arbitration, enjoining Dana from
72
further action allegedly in violation of the agreement.
The district court did not limit itself to the issue of whether the
alleged violation of the neutrality agreement was an arbitrable dispute;-7 3 instead, it proceeded to determine, based on the specific language of the agreement, that the employer's statements violated the
neutrality agreement. 74 The district court dispensed with the NorrisLaGuardia Act's ban on injunctive relief, under the authority of Boys
Markets, and turned to traditional equitable standards to assess the
propriety of injunctive relief. The court found that the union "would
suffer irreparable harm if Dana were unrestrained" because arbitration
subsequent to the election would be a "hollow formality," and entered
an order restraining Dana from further departure from the terms of the
agreement until the union's grievance could be arbitrated. 75 Shortly
thereafter, the UAW alleged that Dana was continuing to breach its
neutrality agreement despite the restraining order.76 The district court
found Dana in contempt of court and granted the UAW injunctive
77
relief.
Dana argued on appeal that the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred the
district court from granting the injunction. 7 In addition, the company
argued that, to the extent the injunction served as a proscription against
future communication, it constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint
72. UAW v. Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634, 638 (6t4 Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc granted and opinion
vacated, id at 654 (Aug. 12, 1982). The district court opinion is reported at 104 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2687 (N.D. Ohio 1980). The union filed its request for a temporary restraining order one week
before the scheduled election.
73. The district court in Dow, "after hearing arguments of counsel for both parties, found
that the dispute between the parties concerning defendant's activities at Gastonia was ... 'on its
face, a breach of an agreement between plaintiff and defendant and [thus was) arbitrable under
the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreemenL'" 679 F.2d at 638 (quoting 104
L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2687-88).
74. 679 F.2d at 638. The existence of the neutrality agreement was critical to the court's
finding that injunctive relief was warranted. In the absence of such an agreement, the injunction
would have been barred by the express language of Norris-LaGuardia. Section 4 of the Act specifically states that no court of the United States may grant a temporary restraining order or an
injunction to prohibit "[giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud
or violence." 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (1976).
75. 679 F.2d at 638-39 (discussing proceedings at trial level) (paraphrasing 104 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 2688).
76. 679 F.2d at 639 (discussing proceedings at trial level). Efforts by the union to compel
arbitration proved fruitless. The day the election was to have taken place, the UAW withdrew its
petition for election.
77. Id at 639-40 (discussing proceedings at trial level). When the preliminary injunction was
issued, Dana moved for a stay. Upon denial of its motion, Dana appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit.
78. Id at 640.
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on free speech and press.79 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
based its affimance of the district court's opinion on the union's demonstration that it had been irreparably harmed, stating that an "arbitration award cannot restore a lost election."80
B. Application of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct's Pan on Injunctive Relief
in the Employer-Injunction Context.
In Dana,"' the court of appeals faced the troublesome problem of
applying the Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctive relief, and the Buffalo Forge limitation on that exception, to a
request for an injunction against an employer, instead of to the more
familiar case of a request by the employer.8 2 Noting that the problem
3
presented by employer-injunction cases had arisen in other circuits,8
the Dana court disposed of the issue by holding that "employer selfhelp measures which.., undermine the arbitral process" are properly
79. Id .at 643. The constitutional question regarding prior restraint of free speech and press
presented in Dana will not be discussed in this note. For a discussion of this question, see
Kramer, Miller & Bierman Neutrality Agreements: The New Frontierin Labor Relations-Fair
Play or Foul?, 23 B.C.L REv. 39 (1981) (general discussion of prior restraint in the neutrality
agreement co6ntext). See aso Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)
("Any prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constititional validity.") (citing Carroll v. President & Comm'r of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968)).
80. Dana, 679 F.2d at 643. Dana's petition for a rehearing en banc was granted by the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In a decision without written opinion, the court vacated the
panel decisio& The trial court, On remand, declared the case moot, because the parties had
reached an agreement through arbitration. 679 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1982), reh'gen bane grantedand
opirdon vacated id at 654 (Aug. 12, 1982).
81. 679 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1982), rehk en banc grantedand opinon vacated,id at 654 (Aug.
12, 1982).
82. One commentator remarked that the Court in Buffalo Forge may well have decided the
case "with one eye toward a spectre of employer injunction cases. Certainly, in a plethora of
situations, readily available injunctive relief would be attractive to unions. The fear of a flood of
litigation might be more substantial in this context than in sympathy strike cases." Cantor, supra
note 30, at 268.
83. Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir.
1976), is the "reverse Boys Markets" case. The Lever Brothers court held that an "injunction to
preserve the satus quo pending arbitration may be issued either against a company or against a
union ... where it is necessary to prevent conduct by the party enjoined from rendering the
arbitral process a hollow formality." Id at 123. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit espoused a similar view in United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir.
1979). It stated that "alihough the Supreme Court in Boys Markets enjoined a strike by a union,
injunctions may in certain circumstances issue against acts taken or threatened by the employer."
Id at 1278. Boys Markets itself explicitly stated that from the time of Lincoln Mills it has been
clear that "a union can obtain specific performance of an employer's promise to arbitrate grievances" without resistance from the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 398 U.S. 235, 242 (1970).
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the subjects of injunctive relief.8 Previously, Boys Markets had provided a means for employers to force unions to the arbitration table
when a union had prematurely resorted to self-help by striking before
seeking to arbitrate. The kind of injunctive relief granted in Dana provides a similar method for unions to force an employer to arbitrate
when the employer appears to be either resorting to self-help in lieu of
arbitration or simply violating the contract.8 5 Both procedures enresolution of labor disputes, and should be
courage the goal of peaceful
86
applied with equal force.
84. Dana, 679 F.2d at 642 (citing Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local
217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976)). Unions have previously sought to enjoin employers from
conduct allegedly violative of collective bargaining agreements. See, eg., United Steelworkers v.
Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1979); Burlesque Artists v. I. Hirst Enters.,
267 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1959); Amalgamated Food Employees v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875
(W.D. Pa.), remanded, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972); Local 90, Stone Mounters v. Welbilt Corp.,
178 F. Supp. 408, (E.D. Mich. 1959), af'd, 283 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1960).
85. Dana could have been brought in the union-injunction context. If the UAW had struck
after Dana failed to come to the bargaining table, it would have been justified in doing so because
itlhad demonstrated its willingness to arbitrate. Under Norris-LaGuardia, Dana would then have
been barred from obtaining injunctive relief. If the purpose of a strike is to force a reluctant
employer to arbitrate, the Boys Markets exception arguably should not apply. Boys Markets represented an effort to avoid situations in which an employer is powerless to stop a union strike
instituted before the union has made an earnest effort to arbitrate. Boys Markets should offer no
aid to Dana in such circumstances, despite the existence of an arbitrable grievance, because the
policy reasons behind that decision are inapplicable. Granting'an injunction against thi hypothetical strike would offend traditional equitable standards for injunctive relief. Dana, as the party
.refusing to arbitrate, would not come to the court with clean hands. Hence, if the court in Dana
had not granted the UAW's request for an injunction, Dana's hypothesized refusalwould have
been tantamount to encouraging a strike, a result in direct conflict with Congress' national labor
policy of promoting peaceful resolution of labor disputes. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141(b), 151 (1976).
But see Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1970) ("Nor
does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate as a matter of course in
every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance."); Shank, supra note 4, at 910 (citing Avco
Corp. v. Local 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Evidently, the issue of willingness to
arbitrate must be raised defensively to become part of the case.")).
86. Despite the logic inherent in equal application to both parties of injunctions against concerted activity, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently decided not to grant an injunction against an epmployer in Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550
F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), ceyL deniea 434 U.S. 837 (1977). Initially, the court granted injunctive relief
to the union. The case then went to the Supreme Court, which remanded and instructed the Ninth
Circuit to reconsider the case in light of Buffalo Forge. See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). On remand, Judge Sneed, writing for the
majority, based the reversal of his initial opinion on two grounds: (1) an employer's actions pending arbitration generally would not frustrate the arbitral process although a strike in the same
situation would do so; and (2) the union would not suffer irreparable harm if its request for an
injunction were refused. 550 F.2d at 1238-39. Despite Judge Sneed's interpretation of the applicability of Buffalo Forge to employer-injunction cases, his reasoning does not dictate the same
result in Dana. Dana's actions pending arbitration did frustrate the arbitral process and did cause
the UAW irreparable harm, because arbitration after the election could not restore the parties to
their status quo ante. Furthermore, the Greyhound court reasoned that in the absence of an express or implied promise on the part of the employer to maintain the status quo, an injunction to
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In UnitedSteelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co. ,87 the first
case in the Steelworkers Trilogy, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, introduced the quid pro quo analysis to labor dispute cases. Because the collective bargaining agreement in question contained no
exception to the no-strike clause, the American Manufacturing Court
refused to read such an exception into the grievance clause on the
ground that one was the quid pro quo for the other. 88 The Court
seemed to recognize that, in labor negotiations, every agreement contains an exchange of promises. A union cannot extract a promise from
an employer without agreeing to something in return. Proper treatment of employer-injunction cases requires a recognition that there are
two sides to this quid pro quo analysis. Employers must also make
concomitant promises if they are to extract promises from unions. The
Court's reasoning in Boys Markets that "employers will be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically enforceable against them
when no similarly efficacious remedy is available to enforce the concomitant undertaking of the union to refrain from striking," 8 9 is

equally applicable when the positions are reversed. Unions, too, will
be wary of agreeing to no-strike provisions unless they can obtain injunctions preventing employers from violating their contract
obligations. 90
Despite the sound reasoning behind the quid pro quo analysis, an
employer could argue, in response to a union's prayer for injunctive
relief, that the Boys Markets exception to the statutory ban on injunctive relief in labor disputes does not apply outside the strike context. 91
preserve it pending arbitration could not be issued. 550 F.2d at 1239. See generally Comment,
lnjumcttoaRestrainngEployersPendigArbtratlot"
Equity andLaborFolhcy, 82 DICK.L. REv.
487, 503 (1978). Arguably, however, neutrality clauses on their face demonstrate a promise to
maintain the status quo.
87. 363 U.S. 564, 564-69 (1960).
88. Id at 567 ("There is no exception in the 'no strike' clause and none therefore should be
read into the grievance clause, since one is the quzdpro quo for the other.").
89. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
90. Id As section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976), "principally insu-

lates worker activity, and as injunctions against employers were not the kind of abuse against
which Norris-LaGuardia was directed, there is a temptation to dismiss Buffalo Forge as largely
irrelevant to employer injunctions." Cantor, supra note 30, at 263-64. Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit has held that "if... the grievance procedures are indeed mandatory for the [union) ....
we cannot say that the district court committed plain error in finding that those procedures are
also mandatory for the Company." United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273,

1279 (3d Cir. 1979).
91. The employer-injunction context offers both sides an escape from the duty to arbitrate. A
union seeking an injunction against an employer would make the threshold argument that the
Norris-LaGuardia injunction prohibition does not apply in the employer-injunction context. This
argument is distinct from the Boys Markets rationale because it asserts a blanket exclusion from
coverage rather than an exception to the Act. Moreover, the argument is not supported by the
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This argument, however, is untenable given the dictum in the Boys
Markets opinion that refers to the reciprocal duties of employers and
unions. 92
C. Preserving the Arbitrator'sRole by Limiting JudicialInterpretation
of Collective BargainingAgreements.

Whether an injunction is sought against an employer or against a
union, the courts after Buffalo Forge have focused on the same question: is the grievance arbitrable? The Supreme Court has stated that
"[n1o obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute arises solely by operation
of law. The law compels a party to submit his grievance to arbitration
only if he has contracted to do so."'93 Presumably, the parties can bargain collectively and yet not submit their disputes to an arbitrator,
choosing instead to use the courts. In such a case, the court's function

under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act is expansive. 94 But when,
as in Dana, the parties have provided for arbitration as the sole method
of dispute settlement, this choice impliedly limits the court's role either

to compelling arbitration or to enforcing the arbitrator's award.95
Plainly, a court must sometimes issue a preliminary injunction to fulfill
96
this role effectively.
language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Not only is there no explicit provision excluding employer-injunction cases from its coverage, but there is indication of a contrary intent. 29 U.S.C.
§ 113(b) (1976) defines "person participating or interested in a labor dispute" in terms that include
both employers and unions.
92. See Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 252-53.
93. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).
94. Accommodation between Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley "allows the judge to apply
the 'usual processes of the law' but not to take the place of the arbitrator." Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 431 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The "usual processes of
the law" must necessarily entail detailed contract interpretation where the parties have.not provided for an arbitrator to serve this function. Where, however, an arbitration clause has been
included, the "usual processes of the law" must necessarily be confined to considerations of equity. See id at 431-32.
95. The Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctive relief is limited to
the contours ofrthe agreement between the parties. Within these limits, the district court may
exercise its equitable powers. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n.
625 F.2d 38, 43 (5th Cir. 1980). As the Court in Buffalo Forge emphasized, "a district court should
not use a Boys Markets injunction, intended to facilitate and encourage arbitration, to usurp the
very function of the arbitrator" by engaging in detailed contract interpretation. Waller Bros.
Stone Co. v. United Steelworkers, 620 F.2d 132, 137 (6th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, in trying to
narrow its holding by requiring an "arbitrable" dispute, the Supreme Court's Buffalo Forge opinion opened the way for decisions such as Dana, which require a federal district judge, in determining arbitrability, to look to the merits of the dispute before granting an injunction. Once
authorized to look to the merits, district court judges are certain to find it difficult to stop short of
actually deciding the merits of the case at the preliminary injunction stage.
96. A preliminary injunction has been described as "an extraordinary equitable tool of the
courts wherein a party to the litigation-at the behest of his antagonist-is forbidden by the court
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In Dana, the district court engaged in a detailed examination of

the employer's conduct that allegedly violated the neutrality clause, determining not only that the grievance was arbitrable, but also that the
employer's conduct constituted a breach of the agreement.97 The district court in effect laid the collective bargaining agreement beside the
letters and the text of the challenged speeches and determined that the
speech was prohibited by the clause. Instead, the district court's function in Dana should have been limited to simply making a determination that the underlying issue might be arbitrable and preserving the
status quo until the arbitrator could decide this issue.98 On the facts of
Dana, such a determination could have been made with little difficulty.
All disputes involving "interpretation and/or application of terms"
were subject to the mandatory grievance procedure. 99 Examination of
this provision and the provision covering the neutrality agreement
would have been sufficient to enable the Dana court to base its issuance
of the preliminary injunction upon a finding that the dispute might be
arbitrable.100 The parties freely chose to have their grievances settled
to engage in designated conduct prior to any final determination.. . that such conduct ought to
be proscribed." Metzger & Friedlander, -he PrekniuryInjunction: Injury Hflhout Remedy?, 29
Bus. LAW. 913, 913 (1974). There "is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which
requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or [which is] more dangerous in a
doubtful case" than the power to grant injunctive relief. W. BARRON & A.J. HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL
PRAcncE & PROCEDURE 1431 (C. Wright ed. 1958) (quoting Justice Baldwin in Bonaparte v.
Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.N.J. 1830) (No. 1617)).
97. See UAW v. Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634, 639 (6th Cir. 1982), reh'g en bane granted and
opinion vacated, and id at 654 (Aug. 12, 1982). The district court opinion is reported at 104
LR.R.M. (BNA) 2687 (N.D. Ohio 1980). When the union reappeared in court complaining that
Dana had violated the temporary restraining order, the district court went on to find that the
"evidence left no room for any doubt whatsoever that the defendant had violated the terms."
Dana, 679 F.2d at 639. It is difficult to imagine a more complete adjudication on the merits than
that demonstrated by the district court in Dana.
98. See Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1342 (4th
Cir. 1978) ("Courts must avoid reaching the merits of arbitrable disputes; their function, within
the narrow ambit ofBoys Markets and Lever Brothers, is to make a determination that the underlying issues may be arbitrable, and preserve the staturquo so that the arbitrators can first decide
this preliminary issue, and then, if appropriate, decide the merits."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929
(1979). As the Court noted in Buffalo Forge,
the parties' agreement to adjust or to arbitrate their differences themselves would be
eviscerated if the courts for all practical purposes were to try and decide contractual
disputes at the preliminary injunction stage ....
[I]t is difficult to believe that the arbitrator would not be heavily influenced or wholly pre-empted by judicial views of the
facts and the meanings of contracts if this procedure is to be permitted.
428 U.S. at 412 (1976).
99. Dana, 679 F.2d at 636. By limiting the court's function to presuming arbitrability, the
question -of the interpretation of the contract would be "properly left to the arbitrator, and not
predetermined by the Court on the ruling on the preliminary injunction." Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir. 1976).
100. This is the prevailing approach among the circuits. It minimizes the inquiry into the
merits and allows the court granting injunctive relief to rely upon traditional equitable standards
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by arbitration based on their confidence that the arbitrator's special expertise in the field would enable him to fill in the terms which the par-

ties failed to adequately express in the contract.10 ' Arbitrators are
chosen, in lieu of judges, to decide labor disputes precisely because

they have such expertise. Arbitrators can consider such factors as "the
effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop ... [and] whether tensions will be heightened or
diminished," in addition to other factors that even the ablest judge cannot be expected to know because he cannot be as well informed in these

areas. 102 By examining the merits of the dispute, the district court
usurped the arbitrator's function and denied the parties the benefit of

their bargain. 10 3
Arguably, the facts in Dana were somewhat unlike those contemplated by the Supreme Court when it held in Buffalo Forge that an

order compelling arbitration must be appropriate before injunctive relief can be awarded. Generally, expedited arbitration will minimize

the harm that will occur if a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction is improperly issued or denied.' °4 In the Dana situation,
however, arbitration could not take place in time to save the election
for the union. If the Dana decision is read as limiting judicial involvement at the pre-arbitration stage to situations in which arbitration
would not have occurred in time to prevent the harmful activity against
which the injunction was sought, then perhaps it is a defensible extenrather than a determination that a violation did in fact occur. Considerations of irreparable injury
and the balance of harms are dispositive, "with only enough judicial inquiry into the merits to
assume the presence of a substantial contractual claim. The advantage of this approach is that it
diminishes judicial preemption of an arbitrator's role." Cantor, supra note 30, at 289-90. In
Dana, there was some question whether the neutrality agreement was part of the collective bargaining agreement. Resolution of this issue would determine whether the mandatory grievance
procedure applied. The arbitrator, however, should be allowed to decide this issue. The court
need only determine that the neutrality clause may be part of the agreement to determine that the
dispute may be arbitrable.
101. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,581-82 (1960).
102. Id at 5§2. The parties rely on the arbitrator's "knowledge of the common law of the
shop and their thist in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgmenL" Id This position was reiterated in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.: "When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and
apply the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem." 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
103. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1960).
104. The underlying rationale ofBuffalo Forgewas that "the process of arbitration is preferred
and the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is to be protected." Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979);
accord Columbia Local, Am. Postal Workers Union v. Bolger, 621 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1980);
United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273, 1282-83 (3d Cir. 1979); Mail Handlers v. United States Postal Sere., 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3107,3109 (D. Neb. 1978); Bakery Drivers Union v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2253, 2255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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sion of Buffalo Forge.105 The difficulty in making a judicial determination that arbitration would not restore the parties to their status quo
ante, however, renders such an extension of Buffalo Forge problematic.

In addition, there is the danger that in the absence of a clearly delineated standard the decision will be read much too broadly.
D. The Presumpt'on ofArbitrabili: Focusing on the Nature of the
Infury Threatened

Although it may not be possible to prevent entirely the lower
courts from examining the contents of the labor agreement when they
are required to determine "arbitrability,"' 06 such an inquiry can be
limited by focusing attention on the nature of the injury threatened,
rather than on the conduct giving rise to the petition for injunctive relief.1°7 As previously noted, in cases in which an employer is seeking
an injunction against a striking union, a distinction is easily drawn between the conduct giving rise to the grievance over which the employees are striking and the nature of the injury threatened from
continuance of the strike.108 The grievance, which may or may not be
105. In his dissent in Bujao Forge, Justice Stevens noted that "to protect the efficacy of arbitration, any such injunction should require the parties to submit the issue... upon an expedited
schedule that assures a decision by the arbitrator as soon as practicable. Such stringent conditions
would insure that only [actions] in violation of the agreement would be enjoined...." Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 431 (1976) (Stevens, J.,dissenting); see also
Gould, On LaborInjuncionsPendingArbitration"
Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REv. 533,
541-42 (1977) ("[Wjhenever a Boys Markets injunction issues, it should be conditioned on the
willingness of both parties to acced to expedited arbitration procedures. Under such procedures,
the.., duration of the court's injunction [is limited] and... the role of arbitration [is preserved]
as the dispute-settlement mechanism."); cf. United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598
F.2d 1273, 1282-83 (3d Cir. 1979) (describing how long an injunction should last).
106. "I lynchpin of Buffalo Forge was the Court's finding that the sympathy strike at issue
would not frustrate the arbitration process." Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Akers Motor
Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979). In Dana, the
arbitration process would indeed be frustrated; arbitration would be a "hollow formality" if it
took place after the election. See UAW v. Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634, 639 (6th Cir. 1982), reh'g en
bane granted andopinion vacated,id at 654 (Aug. 12, 1982).
107. Indeed, the Supreme Court was already broadly interpreting the degree of permissible
judicial interference when it handed down the Buffiao Forge decision. In Boys Markets style
cases, in which an injunction is granted despite Norris-LaGuardia because to do so would promote the policy underlying the Act, the arbitrator may subsequently assess the merits of the underlying dispute. But in post-Buffalo Forge cases, the court examines the precise issue to be
resolved by the arbitrator and therefore adjudicates, in advance, the primary contract dispute. See
Cantor, supra note 30, at 258. The Dana court did decide the primary contract dispute, but only
because a determination at any later date would have been ineffectual.
108. The dominant tests among the federal courts of appeals for the denial or issuance of
injunctions against employers appear to be considerations of the nature of the injury and the
ability of the parties to retura to their status quo ante. See Shank, supra note 4, at 918; see, eg.,
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 379 (1974) (strike called to prevent
subjecting employees to physical danger); United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d
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arbitrable, is separate and distinct from the self-help measure that
threatens injury to the employer.
In the Dana situation, however, the conduct giving rise to the
grievance is identical to the conduct sought to be enjoined. The UAW
was seeking an injunction preventing the corporation from making
anti-union statements, the very activity that the union claimed was in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, requiring determination of the arbitrability of the underlying grievance prior
to consideration of an injunction creates problems. The determination
of arbitrability necessarily involves examination of the merits, but it
need not involve a decision on the merits. It is a matter of degree. One
way to confine a court's inquiry would be to impose a presumption of
arbitrability. °9 Such a presumption would allow the federal courts to
consider whether the situation is one in which traditional equitable
standards warrant injunctive relief, yet would allow courts to avoid a
detailed examination of the merits of the dispute. 10
Focusing on the nature of the injury threatened, rather than on the
parties' conduct, will present definitional problems to federal courts
trying to determine whether equitable relief is warranted under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Act itself describes the equitable standards, and courts have used it as a basis for determining whether to
grant injunctions despite the Act's prohibition. The relevant judicial
concerns are the following: (1) whether the party seeking injunctive
relief has established some likelihood of success on the merits in the
(2) whether irreparable injury is
future arbitration hearing;'
1273, 1282 (3d Cir. 1979) (possibility that an uninsured worker would be denied adequate medical
care constituted irreparable injury); Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc.,
582 F.2d 1336, 1343 (4th Cir. 1978) (injunction allowed to prevent employer from partially liqui-

dating its business because if remaining vehicles and terminals were sold there would be no jobs
for reassignment to union's employees following arbitration), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 633, 511 F.2d 1097, 1100 (1st Cir.) (injunction to
stop the wearing of tank tops in areas seen by persons touring plant was deemed hardly "the type
of injury properly providing a basis for injunctive relief"). cert. de'ed, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
109. See sup.ha text accompanying notes 62-64.
110. The Supreme Court has imposed a presumption of arbitrability in the past. See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,568 (1960) (arbitration clause that, on its

face, requires arbitration in given situation will not be construed in detail by court because the
question of arbitrability is reserved to the arbitrator); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 455 (1957) (federal policy favors specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes on behalf of or against labor organizations).
111. See 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976). For a case construing this requirement, see, e.g., Donnelly
Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 154 F.2d 38, 41-43 (8th Cir. 1946). The statute's requirement that
or have been committed and will
"unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed ...
be continued" has been interpreted to mean "some likelihood of success on the merits." Lever
-Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 1976). The
"likelihood of success on the merits" that must be shown in order to obtain a preliminary injunc-
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threatened and will occur if no injunction is issued;' 12 (3) whether the
harm to the defending party if an injunction is erroneously issued will
be greater than the harm to the complaining party if an injunction is
erroneously denied;11 3 (4) whether the complaining party has "clean
hands"--that is, did it attempt to arbitrate before seeking an injunction
to compel the defending party to arbitrate;" 4 and (5) whether there is
no adequate remedy at law---that is, will money damages fail to make
the complaining party whole if it subsequently prevails at arbitration.IIs Had the district court in Dana presumed arbitrability and focused on these five equitable standards for injunctive relief, it would
have reached the same conclusion without having to interpret the substantive provisions of the contract or to usurp the function of the
arbitrator.
1. Likelihood of Success. -At first blush, the requirement of

"some likelihood of success on the merits" appears just as likely to lead
federal courts to contractual interpretation as the requirement that they
determine arbitrability. But courts can avoid the merits of the contract
dispute if they adopt the approach propounded by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lever Brothers v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217.116 The Lever Brothers
court stated that if the party seeking injunctive relief can prove its position sufficiently sound to prevent the arbitration from being futile, then
-it has met its burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merlion maintaining the status quo pending arbitration means "not simply some likelihood of success
in compelling arbitration but in obtaining the award in aid of which the injunction is sought."
Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1974) (emergency arbitration by union for injunctive relief to prevent shutting down of a plant when collective bargaining agreement contained a
provision subjecting all disputes or complaints to arbitration). But see Lever Bros. v. International
Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 1976) ("a plaintiff, without regard
to whether he is the employer or the union, seeking to maintain the status quo pending arbitration
...need only establish that the position he will espouse in arbitration is sufficiently sound to
prevent arbitration from being a futile endeavor") (quoting Amalgamated Transit Union Div.
1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S. 807
(1976) (judgment remanded for further consideration in light of Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976)), rey'd, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977)).
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1976); see also supra note 53 (discussion of the judicial omission
of the word "property" from this standard).
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976); see, eg., Laufv. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938)
(reference to balance of harms).
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976); see, ,,g.,
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235, 251-55 (1970) (discussion of attempt to arbitrate requirement).
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976); see, eg., Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938)
(reference to no adequate remedy at law).
116. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
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its.117 In Dana, the UAW could have met this burden by presenting to
the court the letter containing the neutrality agreement," 8 the arbitra-

tion clause subjecting all disputes over interpretation and/or application of the terms of the agreement to mandatory arbitration, 1 9 and
proof of some action that triggered the arbitration and/or neutrality
clause. This information would have demonstrated sufficiently that arbitration would not be futile. Such a demonstration would have provided a basis for the court's opinion that there were grounds for
believing that the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause and

would have left to the arbitrator's judgment the ultimate determinations of whether the dispute was covered and whether the contract had
been violated.

.2. IrreparableInjury. The fact that the claim made by the party
seeking injunctive relief appears to be meritorious is insufficient in it-

,self to warrant the issuance of an injunction. The plaintiff also must
demonstrate a need to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. If

no substantial harm will result from permitting the acts complained of
to continue until arbitration takes place, then traditional equitable

standards do not justify injunctive relief. For this reason, Congress and
he will be irreparably
the courts have required the plaintiff to 1show
relief is granted. 20

injured unless injunctive

The federal courts disagree, however, on the concrete meaning of
as
the words "irreparable injury." One test treats irreparable injury
121

essentially the equivalent of frustration of the arbitral process.

An-

other suggested test for irreparable injury is whether the arbitral rem-

edy for contractual breaches is clearly inadequate under the
circumstances, or whether a party's actions render "the arbitral process
a hollow formality."' 122 A third possible approach is to ascertain

120.
117. Id at
118. For the text of the neutrality agreement, see Dana, 679 F.2d at 637. See also supra note
100.
119. For an explanation of the arbitration clause, see Dana, 679 F.2d at 636.
120. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970); 29
U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
121. Local 71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert.denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979). For examples of what constitutes irreparable injury,
compare United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Casting, 598 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1979) (threat of
irreparable injury found where, in absence of injunctive relief, employer would cease making
insurance payments on behalf of employees and hospital and insurance benefits of union members
would lapse), with Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union No. 18,
471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir.) (no threat of irreparable injury found when newspaper decided to install
new typesetting equipment even though some union members' jobs were threatened), cer. denied,
411 U.S. 967 (1972).
122. Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th
Cir. 1976). If after prevailing in arbitration a union would be faced with a fait accompli by the
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whether failure to issue the preliminary injunction to protect a right
would amount to a "destruction of that right" if the issue were subsequently resolved at arbitration in favor of the party seeking injunctive
relief.123
Each of these approaches, while different in form, is essentially the
same in substance. The underlying concern in each is whether subsequent arbitration will be able to return the parties substantially to their
status quo ante. If it cannot, then certainly the arbitral process will be
"frustrated" due to a lack of remedial force. Having been irreparably
injured, the plaintiff would be warranted in viewing the other side's
promise to arbitrate as "illusory."' 24 Therefore, the appropriate test for
irreparable harm is whether the questionable conduct must be enjoined
because the available arbitral process could not restore the status quo
ante in an acceptable form if that conduct was later found violative of
contract rights. 25 In Dana, application of this threshold test would
have resulted in the same conclusion that the district court reached after lengthy consideration of the substantive provisions of the neutrality
agreement. 1 6
3. No Adequate Remedy at Law and Unclean Hands. The "no
adequate remedy at law" and "unclean hands" considerations reinforce the conclusion that injunctive relief was warranted in Dana. Requiring the plaintiff to prove irreparable harm necessarily requires the
court to find that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. If money
damages would make the plaintiff whole then there has been no irreparable injury. Monetary relief would certainly be inadequate in Dana,
as the lost representation election could not thereby be recovered.
With regard to the "clean hands" requirement, certainly the UAW had
exhausted all reasonable methods of compelling arbitration before it
sought redress in the courts. On three separate occasions the union
company, then the arbitration would undoubtedly be "but an empty victory" for the union. Local
71, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (4th Cir. 1978)
(quotingLever Bros., 5.54 F.2d at 122), cert denied,440 U.S. 929 (1979). In such a case the irreparable character of the injury is evident.
123. See Gallagher, Injunctions RestrainingEmployers PendngArbitration-Equfyand Labor
Policy, 82 DICm L. REv.487, 499 (1978).
124. Cf Shank, supra note 4, at 911 (citing Western Publishing Co. v. Local 254, Graphic Arts
Int'l Union, 522 F.2d 530, 533 (7th Cir.) (caveat: this case involved a request for damages rather
than injunctive relief), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976)).
125. Were the offending party later to repeat the actions complained of in the first proceeding,
the complaining party would have no reason to expect that its chances for successfully halting the
action had improved; thus it would be unable to protect the right at stake. This would surely
threaten destruction of that right.
126. See UAW v. Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634, 639 (6th Cir. 1982), reh'g en banc grantedand
opinion vacated,id at 654 (Aug. 12, 1982).
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attempted to arbitrate the grievance and was met with postponement,
promises to cease and desist, and, finally, silence. The UAW was not

guilty of either bypassing or impeding the arbitral process in petitioning the court for an order to compel arbitration.
4. Balance of Harms. The final consideration is that of balancing

the potential harm to the plaintiff if an injunction is denied against the
harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted. In order for a court
to reach this stage, the plaintiff must already have shown that it will be
irreparably injured if injunctive relief is not granted. The defendant
must at the very least establish that it will also be irreparably injured.
If the defendant can meet this burden of proof, then the court must
consider the nature of both irreparable injuries to determine which is
more serious. To balance these threats of injury, courts should consider the policy behind the labor laws.1 27
E. Rebuttal of the Presumption of Arbitrability.
The use of a presumption of arbitrability to enable the courts to
focus on equitable standards for injunctive relief is not novel. The
Supreme Court employed a presumption of arbitrability in the Steelworkers Trilogy. 128 Suggesting that the Supreme Court clearly outline
such a presumption and its mode of operation, therefore, amounts to
29
advocating a return to and clarification of a previous position.

This note suggests that the presumption need apply only in cases
in which the conduct sought to be enjoined was the same conduct
127. In Dana, denial of the injunction would have cost the UAW any chance of being elected
the employees' bargaining representative after six weeks of campaigning. No subsequent arbitration award could win back the election or restore the employees' confidence in the UAW's ability
to effectively represent them in their disputes with the Dana Corporation. Future campaign efforts were thus also frustrated, as already noted, this constituted irreparable injury. Dana, on the
other hand, may have suffered some injury in the form of restraint on free speech and press;
however, subsequent arbitration could have restored Dana to its status quo ante. The injunction
merely prohibited Dana from further speech and press directed at the UAW's organizational efforts until an arbitrator could decide whether such speech and press violated the neutrality clause.
Upon a favorable finding, Dana would have been free for any unexpired portion of the period
preceding this election, and in any other organizational efforts on the part of the UAW, to make
similar statements about the UAW. In sum, no harm resulted to Dana from the district court's
issuance of temporary injunctive relief pending arbitration because the status quo was not
affected.
128. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
129. The desirability of this approach is demonstrated by its attempted use at the court of
appeals leveL Cq Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115,
119 (4th Cir. 1976) (no express exclusion from the arbitration clause and clause reasonably suscep'tible of an interpretation that would incude it) (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
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claimed to be violative of the collective bargaining agreement.1 30 Furthermore, the presumption would be made rebuttable. This factual situation is most likely to lead courts into the merits of the contract
dispute. An examination of Dana demonstrates the operation of this
proposed rebuttable presumption. Once the UAW triggered the presumption of arbitrability, the burden should have been placed on Dana
to rebut the inference raised by the UAW that a contract violation had
occurred and that the UAW would most likely prevail on the merits in
any subsequent arbitration. In Lever Brothers v. InternationalChemical
Workers Union, Local 217, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
set up a two-part test to determine whether a presumption of arbitrability had been rebutted: the defending party must not only demonstrate that the particular type of grievance being disputed was
svecftcally excluded from the arbitration clause, but also that the arbitration clause is not reasonablysusceptible of an interpretation that covers the particular type of grievance being disputed.' 3 ' Clearly, in
Dana, the company could not have rebutted the inferences of arbitrability and likelihood of UAW's success on the merits. The contract
contained no clause specifically excluding the neutrality agreement
from the reach of the arbitration clause. Furthermore, the arbitration
clause itself was susceptible to an interpretation that covered the grievance. The language of the clause was all-inclusive. 132
Once a district court determines that the defending party has not
rebutted the presumption of arbitrability, it may turn to traditional equitable standards for injunctive relief. As noted, the first of these standards-the likelihood of success on the merits-will almost always be
satisfied if the defending party has failed to rebut the presumption of
arbitrability. The next step is to determine whether irreparable injury
is threatened because subsequent arbitration could not return the parties to their status quo ante. If the defending party then cannot demonstrate that it is threatened with more serious injury than the injury
threatened to the complaining party, the complaining party should be
entitled to injunctive relief if it has not itself been guilty of frustrating
the arbitral process.
130. It is this characteristic of Dana that led the trial court into a detailed examination of the
merits of the dispute.
131. See 554 F.2d at 119. Lever Brothers presents a case of "not reasonably susceptible";
Warrior& Guf presents a case of specific exclusion.
132. Cf UAW v. Dana Corp., 679 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 1982) (clause provided for arbitration "should any trouble or controversy arise with respect to the employees within the unit as
between the company and union"), reh'g en bane grantedand opinion vacated,id at 654 (Aug. 12,
1982).
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CONCLUSION

The district court in Dana quite properly awarded injunctive relief
to the UAW. By focusing its attention on the determination of arbitrability, however, the court effectively decided the case on the merits.
The court's infringement upon the arbitrator's function was entirely
unnecessary and improper. The court could have reached the same result, yet could have left the ultimate determination of whether the contract had been violated to the arbitrator. When considered together,
the mandatory arbitration clause, Dana's refusal to arbitrate, the neutrality agreement, and the examples of the statements made by the
Dana official were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of contract
violation.
'In most cases, a cursory examination of the collective bargaining
agreement will be sufficient to permit the court to determine that the
grievance may be arbitrable. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
arbitrability. Once the issue of arbitrability is decided, the courts may
then turn their attention to traditional equitable standards to determine
whether the moving party will suffer harm that can properly be characterized as irreparable if the injunction is denied and whether the opposing party will suffer greater harm if the injunction is granted. The

Supreme Court should adopt a rebuttable presumption of arbitrability
at its earliest opportunity, to prevent courts from continuing to infringe
upon the arbitrator's role and upon the parties' right to contract for an
exclusive method of dispute settlement.
PaulaL McDonald

